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BOOK REVIEWS
Nation Against Nation
Reviewed by William M. Beaney*
Thomas M. Franck,

U.N.
Oxford University Press, New
York (1985); $19.95; ISBN 019-503-5879, 384 pp.
NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE

DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S.

CAN DO ABOUT IT,

This is an extremely important book on a very important, if indeed,
unpopular subject - the experience of the United States with the United
Nations since its founding in 1945.
The creation of the United Nations seemed to follow inexorably from
the devastating experience of World War II and its 50 million dead. Having refused to join the League of Nations, largely ithe inspiration of
Woodrow Wilson, and having tasted the bitter fruits of an isolationist
policy that helped facilitate the rise of Hitler and a militant Japan, President Roosevelt and the American people gave a rapturous welcome to the
concept of an international organization that would help ensure peace.
But, as was recognized even then, the success of the peacekeeping efforts
of the new organization depended on the determined collaboration of the
victorious powers, and continued good relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States. The confidence expressed by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt that he and the Soviet's leader, Joseph Stalin, could "get
along" now appears an unbelievable miscalculation by a politically astute
statesman. As events quickly demonstrated, wartime allies soon became
rivals and an all-out "cold war struggle" began after the end of World
War II began.
In the period 1945-60 the United Nations became a secondary platform in the struggle between the giant powers. The United States possessed the support of a majority in the General Assembly, and could
count on the support or at least the abstention of most of the Security
Council, leaving the Soviet Union in the undesirable position of using the
veto.
Perhaps the high point of the period of early promise of the U.N.
resulted from the successful action of the Security Council in June, 1950
when the Soviets absented themselves from Council deliberations in pro* William M. Beaney is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Denver
College of Law and a member of the Advisory Board of the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy.
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test against the Council's actions in denying the China seat to Peking. In
retrospect this was a victory that displayed the real weakness of the U.N.
In the absence of good relations between the Soviet Union and the
United States, the U.N. was a flawed instrument for the maintenance of
peace. The 20 million deaths attributable to various wars since 1945 emphasize the limitations of the U.N. as a peacemaking and peacekeeping
body.
After 1960 the successes enjoyed by the United States through the
Assembly support became less and less frequent. The Third World came
into being, formed of many small, developing nations (whose votes possessed trading value) and became a vital part of the Assembly. As
Thomas Franck makes clear, they frequently do not vote solidly as a bloc,
but, as a group with a generally socialist bent they are determined to
propose measures and plans that require the wealthy nations (read
United States and Western Europe) to share more of their resources with
the poor nations of the third world.
As the Soviet Union has found the United Nations a more comfortable arena, and the United States has increasingly experienced defeat in
the Assembly and several of the specialized U.N. agencies, in part due to
the anti-Israel posture of the third world, questions have been raised in
the United States Congress, and in high places of the Reagan Administration as to whether continued U.N membership is in the national interest.
The United States has already withdrawn from UNESCO, charging gross
mismanagement by its Director-General, but plainly, it was a move dictated in large part by the unwelcome policies pursued by that agency. As
the author points out, there are serious losses occasioned by the withdrawal from UNESCO, and he urges caution in considering such severe
steps.
What the author shows, citing numerous examples, is that even with
the apparent reluctance of the majority of the U.N. members to march in
step with these United States policies, the U.N. has proved a useful forum for vital discussions and political maneuvers on many past occasions
and, if diplomatic planning and skillful implementation become more evident in the future, the United States can win its share of successes. One
of the strengths of Professor Franck's study is the citation of numerous
instances where the United States simply plunged ahead without a coherent set of plans or goals. One of his conclusions is that:
The United Nations has shown, recently, that it can still win on issues
ranging from Israel's right to participate in the system to respect for
the status of Puerto Rico... Indeed, we could probably win more
often, if we were willing to do the necessary long-range strategic planning and deploy seasoned personnel and equip them with sufficient
carrots and sticks: in short, if we were to take the U.N. seriously as a
place for politics. (p. 271.)
In short, he argues that if we are to participate effectively we must
send a top team, with proper instructions, to play the nation's hand.
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Whatever one may think of her personal ideology, is not one dismayed to
learn that Ambassador Kirkpatrick was known for her ". . . penchant for
gratuitous truculence, the personal put-down, and indifference to others
that has made her, by far, the most personally unpopular representative,
ever, of the U.S. in the U.N." (p.269.) In partial defense of Ambassador
Kirkpatrick and her predecessors, it must be a difficult task for any
United States representative to perform effectively when one's superiors
display a negative attitude toward the U.N. which they wish, or allow, to
be reflected in the conduct of our delegation to the world organization.
If Professor Franck refuses to give very high grades to the professional conduct of the United States at the U.N., what is to be said about
the behavior of the U.N. and its organs? In 1946 Stalin referred to the
United Nations Charter as "a rather good document," but as the author
observes, "Stalin plainly had not for one moment considered redefining
Soviet self-interest to accommodate the idea that his nation might have a
significant stake in the new system of collective security and conflict resolution." The United States at first seemed willing to make an accomadation, but even before losing control of the system, began to abandon it as
a primary instrument of diplomacy. With the superpowers devoted to
other means for advancing their respective interests and resolving their
conflicts, the U.N. assumed a quite different coloration from the dreams
of its founders. Professor Franck describes most vividly the development
of the various instruments and components of the U.N. system. Perhaps
only the Security Council has performed approximately as envisaged.
With the dramatic exception of the Korean episode, described above,
each of the superpowers has used the veto to forestall action harmful to
its interests. The reproving comments of the United States spokesmen
and media when the Soviets made liberal use of the veto in the early
period of the U.N.'s life, disappeared when it became evident the use of
the veto served the interests of the United States.
More interesting has been the growth in the powers of the General
Assembly and the office of the Secretary-General. The author's description of how Dean Acheson as part of his 1950 Korean policy pushed the
General Assembly into a new peacekeeping role through the "Uniting for
Peace Resolution", is a masterful example of how short-range considerations may produce long-range disaster. Once having tasted the heady experience of involvement in situations where the Security Council was incapable of acting, the General Assembly became the willing instrument
for peacekeeping during the 1956 Suez crisis and other future threats to
peace. As a consequence, the growth in the membership of the General
Assembly has resulted in the interesting, though unanticipated spectacle
of the Third World pursuing various goals and enterprises that have little
to do with the major powers, but which produce an unrealistic sense of
power among nations whose equal vote belies their impotence on the
world scene.
The story of the growth in power of the Secretary-General is equally
fascinating. The title of Professor Franck's chapter dealing with this sub-
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ject is highly descriptive, "The Secretary-General Invents Himself'.
(ch.7.) This is perhaps the high spot of the U.N. story. As the author
reminds us, "[p]recisely because [the Secretary-General] role is not
spelled out by the Charter, it is also not hedged with debilitating limitations and procedural incapacities. In this sense, the Secretary-General has
had the freedom to invent himself in the light of the experiences and
realities of the postwar world and has not been hobbled to a bad guess as
to what those realities might be." (p. 118.) A series of strong personalities
shaped the office - particularly the Norwegian Trygve Lie and Dag
Hammerskjold, a Swede. U Thant and Kurt Waldheim, while less innovative did little to shrink the role. On numerous occasions, the SecretaryGeneral throughout U.N. history, has chosen to speak directly to popular
constituencies throughout the world, and has not hesitated to prod governments, both large and small, when peace was threatened or the moderation of conflict seemed possible. The current officeholder, Javier Perez
de Cuellar, like his predecessors, decried the state of world affairs in
which the U.N. has been unable to play the role planned for it, and
warned that the nations "are perilously near to a new international anarchy." (p.133.)
This brief account of Nation Aganst Nation barely suggests the richness of Professor Franck's brilliant account of the occasional successes
and many failures of the U.N. Clearly written, replete with case accounts
involving events and people, this is a book that deserves reading by every
national policy-maker and interested citizen. For apart from his scrupulous respect for the facts, Professor Franck's judgments are always objective and well-conceived. This is a book written from an international perspective by one who has seen the U.N. from the inside.

